


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Approved For Release 2008/06/05 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004000030002-5

3 April 1963

OCI No. 0274/63B

Copy No. 74



# SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

THE ANGOLAN REBELLION AND WHITE UNREST

State Dept. review completed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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5 Apr 1963

**THE ANGOLAN REBELLION AND WHITE UNREST**

The rebellion in Angola is entering its third year with no prospects for an early settlement. It has stiffened Lisbon's resistance to change and reinforced the determination of Angolan nationalists and other Africans to end Portuguese rule. While Portuguese troops are able to contain the feuding nationalist forces for the present, the long-run economic drain on Portugal and the rising discontent among Angola's whites seem likely to force Lisbon eventually to grant autonomy to Angola.


**Rival Rebel Groups**

The two major Angolan political forces, the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), are based outside the territory and have so far been incapable of enlarging the relatively small area of conflict or of creating a common front. As exile groups, their role in the future depends as much on external support as on dissatisfaction within Angola. Neither party is implanted firmly enough within the country to be assured a role in an independent Angola. Both, however, are developing leadership skills, gaining international recognition, and obtaining significant support from African countries.

The UPA, the older and more active of the two, was founded in 1954 by Holden Roberto and six other Angolans resident in Leopoldville. It claims a dues-paying

membership of some 40,000, largely from among the sizable Angolan population around Leopoldville. It also purports to have some 5,000 men under arms, although until recent months much of the fighting seems to have been done by men equipped with only the most primitive weapons and only vaguely connected with the UPA.

Although it now seeks to represent all of Angola, the UPA is primarily a tribal movement of the northern region. The active revolt has so far been limited to this area, which also happens to be the best suited for guerrilla warfare.

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Most of the party's leaders are Protestant. Portuguese propaganda emphasizes that these Protestant connections demonstrate the UPA's minority status in a predominantly Catholic country and thereby disprove its claim to national leadership. Portuguese authorities place much of the blame for the rebellion on American and European missionaries, many of whom they have arrested and deported. Those missionaries who take leave outside the province are being refused re-entry visas.

The MPLA is the result of the merger in 1956 of several factions in Angola. The extent of its following cannot be determined, as it has always been covert within Angola--where many of its founders remain in jail--and has little following outside. Prior to the severe Portuguese repression which followed the outbreak of revolt in 1961, the MPLA had important support among the tiny educated group in the cities, but its present claim of 35,000 active members seems exaggerated. In any case, the strength of the MPLA has lain less in the quantity than the quality of its members, many of whom are mulattoes.

The mulattoes have long been accepted in law as Portuguese citizens, a status extraordinarily difficult for a black African to achieve and one of great importance, as it separates the "civilized" from the "uncivilized" in Portuguese theory and practice. Citizenship tends, however, to cut the mulattoes off from the

subordinate mass of Angolans without giving them any real status in Portuguese society.

The one opportunity it does offer is education. Whereas Holden Roberto of the UPA has the equivalent of secondary education--acquired in the Congo--many of the MPLA leaders are distinguished intellectuals who have studied in Europe. In essence, the UPA is a mass organization with few trained leaders, while the MPLA has the technically qualified, prestigious leadership but no mass following.

The MPLA, whose membership includes some white Portuguese, has been more a Portuguese opposition party than an Angolan nationalist party and has devoted most of its energies to uniting all the various resistance movements throughout Portuguese Africa under its leadership. The UPA has consistently resisted efforts to form a common front, apparently because Roberto fears that the intellectuals would capture his organization from him.

In September 1961 the MPLA moved its headquarters from Conakry to Leopoldville and entered into sharp competition with the UPA for the allegiance of the resident Angolan population. It now is building a military organization there and claims credit for a raid into the Cabinda exclave in January. A report that UPA supporters ambushed and killed 12 members of the returning MPLA raiding party is indicative of their intense rivalry.

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### Foreign Ties

In contrast to the Western-oriented UPA, the MPLA has often been labeled pro-Communist--particularly by the Portuguese. In recent months an internal power struggle has developed over the party's future international orientation. The faction favoring a more genuine neutrality--led by party President Agostinho Neto, who escaped from Portugal a year ago--has reportedly expelled several pro-Marxist leaders and now dominates the MPLA Executive Committee.

Both the UPA and the MPLA have been offered Soviet bloc assistance. While each would probably prefer Western assistance and neither desires a commitment to the Communist world, they both recognize the limitations that the NATO relationship imposes on Western governments, and neither party would have insurmountable compunctions about accepting Soviet aid if it were a question of survival.

Both parties recognize the importance of demonstrating their militancy to persuade other African states to support them. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have all been sympathetic to the rebel cause and a number of Angolans have received guerrilla training in North Africa.

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With the end of Moise Tshombé's secession, the rebels are eager to expand their organization into Katanga, from which they could more easily sabotage the Katanga-Benguela railroad--a blow that would have both economic and dramatic impact.

### Lisbon's Adamant Stand

The Portuguese Government, still determined to defend Angola at all costs, has 35,000-40,000 troops there. Its determination is based both on pride and on the province's tremendous economic potential. Recently discovered oil reserves, for example, are capable of filling all the petroleum requirements of Portugal

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and its territories. Since World War II Portugal has relied on the earnings of its overseas provinces--of which Angola is the wealthiest--to balance its chronic foreign trade deficit. For decades Angola provided a source of cheap raw materials and a market for inferior and exorbitantly priced goods.

In order to preserve the market, Lisbon restricted foreign investment and the production of goods for local consumption. The Angolan economy is geared almost entirely to the production and sale of commodities for export--the most important being coffee. Partly as a result, Angola suffers from the lack of skills and infrastructure necessary even for a rudimentary self-sustaining economy. The vital Benguela railway is vulnerable to foreign influence, for 75 percent of its revenues could be cut off by a political decision in Leopoldville to divert Katanga's ore shipment and other traffic through the Congo.

The 1961 rebellion changed the picture for Portugal. The cost of the fighting left Portugal with a balance-of-payments deficit of \$105 million in 1961, and almost as much last year. It costs Portugal an estimated \$120 million a year just to maintain overseas the additional troops to meet the threat of rebellion in Africa. Thus Angola, now beset with inflation and growing European unemployment, seems to have become a net economic liability to Portugal.

### Reform and Retrenchment

Apart from the military campaign, Lisbon's initial response to the rebellion was to announce a series of intended reforms to broaden African participation in political and economic life and to remove social abuses. Although the American consul general in Angola has reported that much of the legislation seems to be intended as a facade to fend off international pressure, certain of the reform measures are apparently being enforced, such as revoking the old six-month forced labor requirement for Africans and prohibiting the participation of administrative officials in the recruitment of contract labor.

The legislation boosted provincial government costs by nearly 40 percent and required a 45-percent increase in taxes. Local employers and administrators say that the cost of implementing the labor reforms would ruin the local economy: unless they can compel Africans to work without pay, the province's rural roads cannot be maintained.

Nevertheless, Governor General Deslandes pushed forward plans for economic development and social betterment which seemed to white Angolans to offer the chance of creating a genuine multiracial society. His efforts to raise African standards were to be balanced by fresh emphasis on white

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settlement--to bring the proportion of whites to at least 10 percent of the population--and vigorous development of Angola's economic resources. He proposed to tax vast tracts of undeveloped land and planned to start local university classes.

Last September, in an apparent shift of policy, Lisbon dismissed Deslandes. It has since indicated that it will no longer be able to finance the Angolan Development Plan because of the increasing costs of the military campaign against the rebels. The new governor general's one-third cut in Angola's 1963 road construction budget is indicative of this policy of financial retrenchment.

Deslandes' dismissal was a great shock to Angola and has done more than any other single act to solidify white opposition in Angola. Deslandes had tended to see the problem and promise of Angola from an Angolan viewpoint rather than from Lisbon's. His dismissal was widely interpreted as having been the result of pressure from metropolitan financial interests and as proving that Lisbon did not intend to initiate any meaningful reforms which would foster a marked degree of autonomy in the overseas provinces.

The frustration engendered by the belief that Portugal

intends to preserve the status quo at the expense of Angolan development may eventually lead to a demand from Angola's whites for local autonomy or independence. The impetus for separation would probably originate among the local businessmen and small landowners, but the key to success would be the attitude of the military--whose influence is paramount in Angola.

#### The Military Situation

Widespread dissatisfaction with Lisbon reportedly exists among the lower and middle ranks of the Portuguese officer corps and has exponents among even the top ranks. Most of these officers have little economic stake in the metropole and are impatient with the backwardness of their country. Many do have personal ties in Angola. The consul general estimates that as many as a third of the forces now serving there would be willing to stay on as settlers. The military have generally demonstrated a capacity to get along well with the natives and have exerted a surprisingly effective pacification effort.

The armed forces, however, are well aware of their dependence on Portugal. They would be unlikely to support a move toward independence unless they believed that Lisbon's overseas policies were bound eventually to lose Angola to radical African nationalists or unless a change of government in Portugal

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made it appear that the army might lose its privileged position. As its price for supporting independence, the military might insist on a political solution of the rebellion through negotiations.

At present, neither the Portuguese troops in Angola nor the rebels have the capability of eliminating the forces of the other. Although the rebels cannot engage in major encounters, they have the men and the promise of arms to sustain guerrilla-type activity. Although the Portuguese should be able to contain rebel activity, unless major fighting erupts in other territories, they will be unable to eliminate the rebel bases. The Portuguese military in Angola realize that, without

a drastic change of policy in Lisbon, a long war of attrition is in prospect, and that in the long run they cannot win such a war.

While the UPA is widely believed to be racially oriented and firmly committed to the ouster of all white influence, there is a feeling current among all levels of Angolan society that an eventual accommodation is possible between the whites and the Portuguese-educated intellectuals who lead the MPLA. This is likely to determine the approach which the white population would have to any negotiations in an autonomous Angola.

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